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1. Background
The elections held on 5 April were Indonesia’s second free elections since Soeharto,
its former military leader, was ousted in 1998. These elections were to be followed by
the country’s ﬁrst ever direct presidential election on 5 July with possible run-oﬀs in
September. The ﬁrst post-Soeharto election, in June 1999, paved the way for coalition
politics, with the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the party of the
incumbent President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, winning most of the vote. Most
importantly, that election saw the ﬁrst breach in the dominance of Golkar, the political
organisation under Soeharto’s regime. However, the public has grown increasingly
disillusioned withMegawati’s administration and support has shifted to newer parties.
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Under Soeharto’s NewOrder, various depoliticisation strategies such as ‘the ﬂoating
mass’, forbidding political parties at the village level, were in place to ensure landslide
victories for Golkar. Since the downfall of Soeharto, a series of reforms have replaced
these restrictive policies, with Indonesians now enjoying greater political freedom.
Apart from reforms to the electoral system (see below), another step forward towards
democratic rule is the replacement of the appointedmembers of the People’s Consultative
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawarahan Rakyat, MPR) for the new senate-like Regional
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD).1 Candidates for the DPD
elections stand for election independently, and many are associated with major parties,
although a few served under theNewOrder. Only a handful seem genuine representatives
of their province. In total, four will be elected from each of the 32 provinces.
The DPD, which has often been compared with the US Senate, which, together
with the national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), will form the new
MPR. However, this is not to be interpreted as a true bicameral system in which both
bodies have equal weight to legislate. First of all, the 128-member DPD does not
come near to balancing the 550-member DPR. Consequently, the DPD lacks the
weight to veto. Secondly, the Constitution stipulates that the DPD is limited to
inputs concerning centre-regional issues, such as regional autonomy and regional
budgets, and rules out any right to legislate. The DPD’s limited powers must be seen
in the context of the 17,500-scattered islands and a history of secession. For anxious
nationalists and the military, more power devolved from the centre would mean
a step closer to federalism and a step further away from the unitary state.
3. Electoral system
In the proportional ‘closed list’ system used in the 1999 elections, voters simply
chose a party, and seats were allocated by the parties according to their lists. This
was widely criticised for lacking the mechanisms to make representatives account-
able to their voters. The changes introduced were designed to bring representatives
closer to their constituencies.
The proportional system has been retained but modiﬁed to an ‘open list’ system, and
altogether 2025 new electoral districts were drawn to reduce the size of the larger
constituencies.2 In the open list system, voters can select both the party and the
candidate of their choice from a slate put forward by each party. Voters must choose
a party, but they do not have to choose a candidate. If a voter chooses only a candidate
but fails to pick a party, the vote is invalid. If voters choose a party but not a candidate,
the party allocates the seat as under the closed list system.3 At the actual poll, voters
selected candidates and parties on four newspaper-like ballots a metre wide.
1 The Jakarta Post, 10 March 2004.
2 Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 April 2004.
3 Indonesia Backgrounder: A Guide to the 2004 Elections, International Crisis Group Asia Report, no.
71, 18 December 2004. http://www.crisisweb.org. p. 5.
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On 5 April, voters in Indonesia went to the polls to select candidates for three levels
of government: for the DPR and for the regional parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) at the provincial and district levels4, as well as for the DPD.
Altogether, 24 parties contested the election, with 448,705 candidates competing for
15,276 oﬃces. A total of 585,218 polling stations were erected for the day.With at least
147 million eligible voters scattered across 17,500 islands covering three time zones,
preparation for the election was no easy task for the General Election Commission
(KPU). Hence, it was described as ‘‘the most complex and the biggest single-day event
that has been held by a developing country’’.5 Despite glitches with ballot printing,
a few irregularities, and the KPU’s admitted failure to register all eligible voters, the
elections were conducted peacefully. Although several reforms had been introduced,
including the direct presidential election later in the year, many remain sceptical about
what fundamental changes these may bring to post-Soeharto politics.
5. Electoral campaigning
Electoral campaigning during the Soeharto years was called pesta demokrasi
(ﬁesta of democracy) which focused more on ﬁesta than the substance of democracy.
Little has changed in this respect. Five years post-Soeharto, political parties still
make endeavour to bedazzle their supporters with dangdut (local pop music) and
shower them with giveaways such as t-shirts, bottled water, in some cases money,6
even though this violates the electoral law. Little was spoken of ideology. Rather, the
focus was on familiarising voters with the party’s emblems and the number on ballot
papers, as well as capitalising on Megawati’s disappointing administration. What
diﬀered from earlier campaigns, as well as the 1999 elections, was that the ﬁestas
were limited to the latter part of the campaigning: 26 March to 1 April.
The 22-day campaigning period, running 11 March–1 April, was divided into two
periods, with one day’s rest for Nyepi, the Hindu Day of Silence, and a three-day
cooling-oﬀ period before election day. From 11 March until 25 March, parties were
expected to deliver their agendas for the next ﬁve years and allow the audiences to
question politicians directly. As expected by many party leaders, indoor campaigning
was poorly attended due to unfamiliarity with dialogue-driven campaigning.
However, despite the KPU’s appeal for parties to emphasise dialogue with their
supporters during this period, most of the 24 parties ignored this.7
4 Sometimes referred to as ‘councils’ or ‘assemblies’. The parliaments at the provincial and district levels
are known as Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat I (DPRD I) and Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat
Daerah Tingkat II (DPRD II) which mean the People’s Representative Council Level I and the People’s
Representative Council Level II, respectively.
5 The Jakarta Post, 5 April 2004.
6 The Jakarta Post, 26 March 2004.
7 The Jakarta Post, 22 March 2004.
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public’s lack of familiarity with both the new system and the candidates.8 A tracking
survey conducted December 2003–March 2004 by the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems indicated that only 58% of voters were aware of the DPD and
even less knew how to vote in the DPD election.9 The KPU has also admitted its
failure to educate voters in this respect.10
The reduction in political parties from 48 in 1999 to 24 in this election was largely
due to amendments in the election law. Only parties that, in the 1999 elections, won
2% of the DPR seats or 3% of the DPRD seats in half the provinces and districts were
allowed to contest the 2004 national elections. Altogether six parties from the 1999
elections met these requirements: Crescent Star Party (PBB), United Development
Party (PPP), National Mandate Party (PAN), National Awakening Party (PKB),
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), and the Golkar Party. Parties were
allowed to merge or dissolve to form a new party, but they had to meet the new
criteria in the general election law, which requires parties to have executive
committees in at least two-thirds of the provinces and at least one-third of the
districts within those provinces. A new party must also have at least 1000 members or
one-thousandth of the population in the district where the party has an established
base.11 The rationale for these changes was to reduce the number of smaller parties.
The national elections still exclude former members of the Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI). However, a recent decision by the Indonesian Constitutional Court has
restored their rights to run for legislative oﬃce, but not for the presidency. As the
decision came after the deadline for submitting legislative candidates for the 2004
elections, this ruling will take eﬀect only in the 2009 elections.
6. Election day
International monitors reported12 that the election was, on the whole, conducted
peacefully and smoothly, even in areas such as Poso (central Sulawesi), Papua, and
Maluku where there were fears that violence would disrupt the process.13 An
exception war-torn Aceh was, which has been demanding independence since the
1970s. The only hitch was the shortage of election materials, which prevented some
electors from voting.14
In all, some 499 stations were recommended to re-run the election due to
violations of the election law and other irregularities, including unregistered voters
8 The Jakarta Post, 30 March 2004.
9 Results from Wave I through IX of Tracking Survey, International Foundation for Electoral Systems
(IFES). http://www.ifes.org.
10 The Jakarta Post, 20 April 2004.
11 Some Questions about the Electoral System for the 2004 Indonesian Elections Answered,
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), Revised January 2004. http://www.ifes.org.
12 See International Observer Resource Center website: http://www.iorc-indonesia.org.
13 The Jakarta Post, 6 April 2004.
14 The Jakarta Post, 6 April 2004.
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regions, including areas in Java, re-runs were held after ballots were accidentally
switched with those of other districts.
Voter turnout dropped compared with the 1999 election. Of the 148,000,369
registered voters only 84.1% cast their vote, whereas 94% of the 118,217,393
registered voters did so in 1999. Invalid votes accounted for 8.8% of the ballots
cast.16 Some have suggested that the lower turnout signiﬁes a change of heart about
democratic rule; that the public has become increasingly disillusioned with the
performance of consecutive post-Soeharto governments. An opinion poll conducted
in August 2003 by the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, LSI)
indicated that 58% voters believed their welfare was better looked after under the
New Order. On the other hand, the KPU has blamed the lower turnout on the new
electoral system and new registration procedures. The KPU has also admitted that
many voters did not receive their voter cards in time for the election.17
7. The results
As with the preparations, the counting of votes was complicated. Unlike the 68-
day wait for the oﬃcial results after the 1999 elections, the KPU launched the ﬁrst-
ever computerised tabulations. These were subject to repeated eﬀorts by a few parties
to reject the results on the grounds of voting irregularities and that the counting
lacked transparency. As the results of the re-runs trickled in, the announcement of
the results, scheduled for the 28 April, were postponed until 5 May. This further
delayed the registration of presidential and vice-presidential nominations.
The 2004 election results were a major blow to the PDI-P; see Table 1. The party
only mustered 18.5% of the vote (109 seats), a signiﬁcant drop from its 33.7% in the
1999 election. The improving economy was not enough to impress voters and the
involvement of party members in corruption tarnished the party’s image. Kwik Kian
Gie, a senior member of PDI-P and Coordinating Minister of Economy, Finance,
and Industry, bluntly admitted that ‘‘the largest corruption is committed by my
party’’.18
Victory for Golkar was a reversal from the 1999 elections. This might suggest that
Indonesia’s democratic transition is in line with the wider trend of resurrecting
former regime parties – as in many East European countries – where voters have
preferred parties they were familiar with rather than newly created ones.19 However,
although Golkar won the most votes, its victory did not merit massive celebrations.
With just 21.6% of the vote (128 seats), there was slippage from the 1999 election;
also it fell short of its aim for 30%. Moreover, despite its victory, Golkar still needed
15 The Jakarta Post, 20 April 2004.
16 The Jakarta Post, 7 May 2004.
17 The Jakarta Post, 18 April 2004.
18 The Jakarta Post, 18 February 2003.
19 Rose, R. 1997. Where are postcommunist countries going? Journal of Democracy, 8(3): 93.
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presidential nomination, Wiranto, who is indicted for human rights abuses in East
Timor, would win the presidential election.
Much to the surprise of many, smaller parties fared reasonably well. Overall, three
such parties gained much of their support in areas considered strongholds for older
parties.20 The Democratic Party (PD) and Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) did
especially well in the capital, rising from obscure places to ﬁfth and sixth position
respectively.21 Support for the PD had much to do with its co-founder, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, popularly known as SBY, who is tipped to be a popular choice
for the next president. Perceived as calm and with a good military track record, he has
scored well with the Indonesian electorate; for example, a survey by the Centre for
Political Studies indicates a 47% rating for SBY as of June 2004. His proﬁle increased
dramatically while serving as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Aﬀairs
in Megawati’s cabinet, becoming a familiar face on national television during the
upsurge of violence in Aceh, West Papua, and Poso. His proﬁle peaked when
Megawati’s husband branded his behaviour as ‘childlike’ during a dispute with the
President, which won him sympathy among voters. The PKS, on the other hand,
struck a positive chord with its clean and incorrupt image. Finally, the Prosperous
Peace Party (PDS), although winning only 2% of the vote, gained much support from
the Christian population due to the religious violence in Poso and Ambon. One eﬀect
of the elections, then, was to bring newer players to the political forefront. Another,
was to send out an obvious message: Indonesians wanted change.
Although the shift of support from older to newer parties may show signs of
maturity in the Indonesian electorate, most voting behaviour was still based on the
Table 1
Parliamentary election results in Indonesia, 2004 and 1999
Party 2004 1999
Vote (%) Seats Vote (%) Seats
Golkar Party 21.6 127 22.5 120
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) 18.5 109 33.7 153
United Development Party (PPP) 8.2 58 10.7 58
Democratic Party (PD) 7.5 56 – –
National Mandate Party (PAN) 6.4 53 7.1 34.0
National Awakening Party (PKB) 10.6 52 12.7 51.0
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 7.3 45 – –
Reform Star Party (PBR) 2.4 14 – –
Prosperous Peace Party (PDS) 2.1 13 – –
Crescent Star Party (PBB) 2.6 11 1.9 13.0
Other parties 12.8 12 11.4 33.0
Sources: The Jakarta Post, www.thejakartapost.com, accessed September 2004; Suryadinata, 2002.
As a result of a Constitutional Court Ruling following the elections, there have been changes to the
number of seats in the following parties: PBR, PDS, PAN, Pioneer Party, Freedom Bull National Party,
United Democratic Nationhood Party and Golkar. The ﬁgures in the table reﬂect these changes.
20 Tempo Interactive, 13–19 April 2004. http://www.tempointeractive.com.
21 The oﬃcial General Election Commission (KPU) online results. http://tnp.kpu.go.id/Tabulasi/.
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perceived as a victim of Soeharto’s repressive regime, which had given her the
‘sympathy vote’ in the 1999 elections. Similarly, SBY won sympathy from the public
after his dispute with Megawati and her husband.
8. Prospects
Not until after the results of Presidential election are known will Indonesians get
a good picture of how the new government will take shape. Apart from replacing
appointed seats in the MPR, it is uncertain what the newly elected DPD will bring.
Amendments to the constitution stipulate that only parties garnering 3% of valid
votes or 5% of the seats in the DPR are allowed to nominate a candidate for
President or Vice-President. Moreover, the law stipulates that the triumphant pair
have to win at least 50% of the popular vote. With no candidate having a clear
majority in opinion polls, Kusnanto Anggoro, a prominent political observer, has
argued that parties should muster a three-party coalition: ‘‘It’s not just the posts of
the president or the vice-president [but] the concessions for the ministerial positions,
too, [that] are important and warrant attention’’.23
Hence, many remain reserved about the fundamental changes that direct
presidential elections will have on the nature of post-Soeharto politics. With the
oﬃcial results of the legislative elections barely out, presidential and vice-presidential
nominees began courting one another to gear up for the presidential elections.
Pairing up was based on calculations reﬂecting the two main political streams in
Indonesian politics: secularism and nationalism on the one hand, and Islam, on the
other.24 A directly elected president will enjoy wide support among the electorate,
but the new government will still consist of a coalition of divided parties.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Andrew Wyatt for his helpful suggestions for this article.
References
Suryadinata, L., 2002. Elections and Politics in Indonesia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,
pp. 103.
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2004.10.006
22 Post Script Presidential Circus, The Habibie Center, Vol. 1, No. 1, May 2004. http://www.
thehabibiecenter.or.id.
23 Tempo Interactive, 20–26 April 2004. http://www.tempointeractive.com.
24 See Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2002), Chapter 1.
